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CONSEQUENCES OF IZMIT (KOCAELI) EARTHQUAKE (TURKEY,
AUGUST 17,1999) ON INDUSTRIAL PLANTS AND SOME JETTIES
F. Masson, J. P. Pineau, J. J. Tritsch
INERIS, Parc technologique Alata, BP 2,60550 Verneuil en Halatte, France
ABSTRACT
After investigation of the consequences of the Izmit earthquake in nine industriell plants, a
report •was  writlen for the French ministry of Environment. The main objective was the
comparison with the Situation of earthquake prone French industries.
General Information on this earthquake and its economic consequences in the Izmit area are
first given. Then, typical accidents induced by the earthquake (referring to nine visited plants)
involving dangerous chemicals (five cases) are described and proved the need for assessing
equipment and infrastructure vulnerabilities, referring to consideration of regulatory aspects.
Risk assessment and preventive and protective measures are to be introduced in specific
safety cases dealing •with  seismic ejfects for industrial plants and port areas. The objective of
this safety case is to prove the stability of facilities (non total collapse), but also some
functional and operational capability m Order to avoid adverse effect on man and
environment.
1 ESTRODUCTION
The earthquake, arisen ON August 17, 1999 to Izmit ( Kocaeli), Turkey, of magnitude 7.4, is not
exceptional in this region (7 earfhquakes of magnitude superior to 7 have occured since 1939) ;
accelerations on the ground, between 0.2 g and 0.4 g in the stricken zones, are rather moderate
considering the magnitude.
The affected zone, situated in the southeast of Istanbul, near the Sea of Marmara, extends on 200
Idlometres in length and 50 kilometres in width in a region with strong density of population and
industrial plants. In the part of this region direcdy hit by the earthquake and depending of the Izmit
Chamber of lndustry, 30 % of industrial plants have had important damages, 20 % can be repaired
within one month and 10 % cannot be repaired. l % of the workforce was killed and the production
loss was estimated äs 1-1.5 billion US dollars every month after the earthquake. Following the 7.4
magnitude earthquake in Turkey, current estimates of total insured loss have ranged from l bn to
2.75 bn US $ whereas the total damage is estimated at 16 billions US $. The earthquake involved a
lot of industrial plants of the Izmit economic area (13% of Turkey industrial production).
The earthquake caused all possible underwater and on land phenomena such äs landslides and
ground collapses, rockfalls, ground liquefacüon.
At the request of the Direction of the Prevention of Pollutions and Risks of the French Ministry of the
Regional development and the Environment (MATE), the INERIS studied :
• intervenäon in emergency situadon within the framewoik of the fire of six floating roof tanks of
liquid hydrocarbons arisen in Izmit's refinery,
• the effects of fhe earthquake in indiistrial installations of lzniif"s region.
First phase, realized fioni 19 all 21 August 1999, in contact with the Direction of the Defence and
the Civil Safety of the French Home Office, allowed to put in evidence the difBculty of
implementation of means of intervenäon on such a fire of petroleum products in tanks.
Second phase was assured from 2 till 11 September 1999 in contact with the mission, led to the
same dates, of the Fiench Association of Parasismic Engineering (AFPS).
Nine industrial plants were visited, for some of diem with the assistance of the Izmit Chamber of
industry. Damages on equipment, infrastructure and buildings were invesdgated for defining
typology. More detailed information about damages on infrastucture can be found in l) and 2).
2 VISITED PLANTS
These plants were generally located in the neighbourhood of the Sea of Marmara, often on alluvial
grounds or embankments.
Visited installations were:
• a cement plant ; installation suffered only minor damages and was able to quickly restart,
• a refinery where damages concemed different tanks, a jetty, a Stack which collapsed on a
process plant, a control room, the Underground network for water supply against fire,
• a storage of liquefied petroleum gas ( LPG), for filling domestic bottles and lorries where
damages were very minor and did not prevent a fast restart,
• an installation manufacturing chlorinated products, where chlorine was made by electrolysis, but
was not stored ; a lot of electrolytic cells underwent damages, buildings presented minor
damages, a jetty collapsed in sea on 125 m,
• an installation, including a jetty, where liquid organic products are stored and damages were
minor,
• an installation manufacturing aluminium profiles where certain buildings with concrete frame
(concrete beams walled in with bricks and mortar or concrete slabs) collapsed,
• an installation for manufacturing plastic pipes where buildings with concrete frame (concrete
beams walled in with bricks and mortar or concrete slabs) collapsed killmg two wolkers,
• an installation manufacturing acrylic polymers where three reservoirs let escape their content in
the corresponding concrete retention pools. 250 m of jetty collapsed in sea and a concrete duct
conveying some process water broke and had to be replaced.
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3 TYPICAL ACCIDENTS BNDUCED BY THE EARTHQUAKE
During the occinrence of this 7.4 magnitude earthquake m (he laust arca, dose to fhe Sea of
Mannara, some typical accidents (non exhaustive list) occuned in a refinery, in its vicinity (GPL
pipeline), in an acrylic polymers plant and elsewhere.
• Six naphta tanks of a refinery were involved during five days in a fire, which did not fortunately
propagate to other reservoirs or installations. A 120 m high Stack collapse during the earthquake
with major effects on a process plant closed several months for complete repair.
• In an installation manufäcturing aciylic polymers, a leak of 6500 tons of acrylonitrile led to the
death of fhe fauna nearby because of the fonoing of a toxic cloud after release and evaporation
of this liquid in concrete retention pools following a break of three pipes at tbe bottom of ihree
tanks; a ground pollution occurred also because of cracks appeared in these retention pools
during fhe earthquake making a pathway to ground pollution.
• An Underground liquid petroleum gas (LPG) pipe connecting a refinery with storage spheres in a
nearby installation broke during Ihe earthquake, led to the forming of a cloud which was ignited
(flashfire) by a lony crossing the cloud and led to the fire of a nearby paint storage fäcility and of
lorries with two fätalities : the lony drivers.
• Broken pipes, breakage of equipment and storage facilities and on jetties let release chemicals on
ground; from collapsed jetties a sea pollution was also possible at some locations, but no
information was available.
Some accidents occulring in the aftermath of an earthquake shall be avoided partly by a proper
design and maintenance of plants considering the effects of the seismic waves on plants, buildings and
facilities.
Other accidents or their consequences are avoidable by proper action at the very begüming of the
earthquake considering :
• fimctions to be maintained
• operations to be stopped.
Such approaches should be related to risk assessment methodologies where the effects of sismic
waves are to be related to soll structure
4 EQUIPMENT VÜLNERABILITY IN INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
4.l Consideration of regulatory aspects
The investigation was devoted to the evaluaäon of potential damages in relationship with the types of
facilities and their location and possible accidental scenarios in relationship with the probabüity of
" overaccident " (risk increase related to a dangerous plant) for vulnerable points in a plant äs
requested in French regulation.
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4.1.1 French regulation
Accordmg to the French law, industrial plants considered äs a special risk need parasismic
construction, planning and Operation ruies explained m a specific study "etude parasismique ".
Consideration is to be paid to seismic zoning (national and local), active faulte and site effecte, the
important parameter being the Likely Historical Reference Earthquake -LHRE- (considering
historical data). At the very end of the process the intensity to be considered is equal to the intensity
of LHRE+1. The above mentioned specific study, part of the safety case, has the objective, knowing
the seismic hazard, to define vulnerable equipment (and parts thereof) and possible accidents, the last
phase being the verification of adapted dimensioning against the seismic effecte.
The objective of the study is to prove the stability (non total collapse), but also some fünctional and
operational capability in Order to avoid adverse effect on man and environment
4.l.2 Turkish regulation
In Turkey, for dangerous plants, a sanitary protection cordon has to be established on the basis of a
risk assesment but information is missing about the licensing process and the inspection, land use and
emergency planning and specific consideration of earthquake effects.
4.l.3 Approach of the experts
Conclusions fiom Ihe observations in Tmkey could only be validated if detailed files for the plant
(geotechnic studies, engineering documents, risk assessment) are made available. Until now, this
work has not been undertaken.
Howe-ver, it was possible to define potential damages by reference to the ground stability. Then,
taldng into account the overaccident, vulnerable equipment were globally analysed on the basis of
reported observations either in industrial plants or in infrastructurc.
4.2 Influence of ground stability on potential damages
The cement plant was the only plant pardy located on solid rock, the others were built on natural or
artificial embanlanents ; 5 from the 9 visited plants were dose to the seashore. Five plants were
located in an industrial estate and surrounded by other hazardous plants where domino effects are
possible.
Tabte l summarises the potential damages considering ground stability.
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Table l : Potential damages related to unstable ground
Plant type and equipment
Cement plant



















LPG spheres and cylinders de
GPL, Füling stations for
Containers and lorries Pipes
Acryüc polymers









(housing in the vicinity)
Seashore, alluvial ground
(housing in the vicinity)
1 km from seashore, alluvial
ground, (housing in the vicinity)
Seashore, alluvial ground, no







Possible, alluvial ground and
possible landslides
(seashore)
Possible, alluvial groundl and
possible landslides
(seashore)
Possible, alluvial ground and
possible landslides
(seashore)
Likely but less probable than
in the three previous cases
Very likely, alluvial and
landslides
Possible, dose to the fault
and ground movement
4.3 Equipment vulnerability in industrial plants
Considering the possible overaccident and possible hazards, the vulnerability was qualitatively
analysed for the nine visited plants.
4.3.1 Energy and utilities
Electric energy was lost shortly after the earthquake. Generally, emergency supply was operating
with apparently an exception in the acrylic polymers plant where a lack of energy lasted 39 hours.
In some cases (refinery), public water supply (especially for fire fighting) was also lacking.
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4.3.2 Jetties and port areas
Some examples of the general findings are given in table 2.
Table 2 : Possible hazards fiom jetty maliünction probability
Plant type and equipment
Cement plant




























Sea and ground pollution












From an industrial source it was mentioned that for a total amount of 34 industrial jetries ; 10 % sunk
partly or totally in the sea.
It should also be mentioned that the Turkey Naval Base in Gölcuk, located on the fault, suffered
extensive darnage with collapse of buidings Idlling several hundrcd militaiy personnel.
4.3.3 Pipes
Above ground polyester pipes located in a plant were broken but without major damages; some
Underground concrete ducts (process water ) in another plant (avoiding plant Operation) or steel
pipes (LPG release with a flash fire induced, water release impeding an efficient fire fightmg) in a third
one have been broken.
A special attention is to be paid to connecting pipes and their connections to enclosures (fhree
" guillotine" breaking in a chenucal plant inducing a 6.500 tonne release of a liquid toxic chemical.
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4.3.4 Tanks and reservoirs
Liquid movement is certainly at fhe origin of the damages. The damages are the most important in
atmospheric metallic tanks of a rather moderate volume (between 1000 and 10000 m3).
4.3.5 Process equipment
In Üie EQE Briefing (2) was rcported the collapse of a cooling tower in a pefrochemical plant, of
cranes in a steel factory. The direct impact of the earthquake can also be mentioned on a lime tank in
an acrylic polymers plant and for the collapse of a 230 m high heater Stack in the refinery.
4.3.6 Industrial buüdings
In many cases, buildings were built äs concrete fiamed (concrete beams walled in with bricks and
mortar or concrete slabs) and collapsed. In one plant two people were killed. Paitial collapse was
also ment»oned for a tire fectory.
Wifhout an assessment of fhe mechanical resistance of the buildings, it is not possible to draw valid
conctusions : the design, the construction and the behaviour of the ground need to be considered
altogether.
4.3.7 Prevention measures and emergency response
With the exception of fires in floatmg roof tanks, the fire in other bcations of the refinery were
extinguished rapidly using the means available in the refinery.
As regards the floating roof tanks, it was decided to allow buming the content of tanks and to
protect the neighbouring tanks by pouring water to avoid a temperature increase and fire
propagation. This strategy was successfal but a bit risky in an area where LPG and ammonia tanks
were m the vicinity, respectively 300 m and 500 m.
VULNERABILITY OF INFRASTRÜCTURE (l) (2)
Turkey lost electric power shortly after the earthquake because of damage to a 380kV Substation in
Adapazari. Effects were also obtained in other substations and 172 transformers, mamly owing to
buildings collapse (out of 240).
In the Izmit area, water is supplied from a 60 mülion-cubic-meter dam which experienced 2 meter-
sloshing in the event Water treatment plants and major distribution Systems performed reasonably
well, sustaining minor damages, local failures were suffered owing to the collapse of buildings and soil
subsidence.
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Roads suffered damages (especially collapse of a bridge on a bus on the main highway Istanbul-
Ankara), in areas where the roads intersected the fault and where subsidence occuned. Otherwise
the majority of bridges, motorway and local roads performed well.
It was mentioned a leak on <he main distribution pipeline of compressed gas at the location where the
underwater part merges on land
-
 The distribution System was more severely hit 30% of gasmeters
(3600) were shut off and 500 connections had to be changed owing to buidings collapses mamly.
As reagards communications, 385.000 lines and 101 centres were located in the area hit by the
earthquake ; in general, the buildings did not suffer large damages, but various consequences were
obtained (flooding in a centre, batteries ruptures, cables cutting).
In Golcük and Izmit, the hoispitals did not suffered damages.
The main buflding of die fire brigade in Golcük collapsed with 20 fatalities.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In Izniit area, industry suffered heavy losses either related to buildings collapses, or to process
failures or to intemal or extemal infiastructure failures. In general, not unknown phenomena were
involved. The main lesson should be the need of risk assessment referring to regulatory requirements
by experienced structural and process engineers joinüy with die application of conmion mies for
seismic prone areas.
As regards the effects of overaccident (risk increase related to dangerous plant) the occurrence of a
release of toxic liquid in acrylic polymers plant and a five-days fire in sfcrage tanks in a refineiy are
of particular concem. It means for nie füture the need for more detaüeq risk assessment of seismic
effects including consideration of soft ground motion, the locaäon versus the fault, the severity of the
damage, the safety measures for avoiding and mitigating the effects, die domino effects from
accidental scenarios and the application of die enaergency response m a specific study. Specific
studies are also needed for port areas and jetties.
The business intenupdon losses are also to be taken into consideration. Last but not least die
environmental effects especially related to die vast releases of chemicals in ground and water must be
considered in situalions where logistic means for fighung and remediadng are missing for hours or
days.
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